University of Virginia Library

United People Strategy Reconsidered

The boycott approach taken by United People was a long-term, high-risk strategy. As the drama unfolded, the strategy seemed to have accomplished its goals, or nearly so. Not without costs, however.

Could the same goals have been accomplished over a four-year period by working behind the scenes? The United Fund leadership asserts that most of the changes made had been planned before United People entered the scene. Our efforts, from a distance, to assess social-action projects lead us to believe that UP at least succeeded in speeding the change process. Had they chosen other than the boycott strategy, their demands may not have weighed so seriously, nor the United Fund have taken the initiative itself. One corporation executive privately warned the protest group that "many persons are looking for an excuse not to give to United Appeal and you just may be supplying them with that excuse." Clearly, the boycott, although a high-risk strategy, accurately focused on the most vulnerable flank of the organization. All else depends on fund-raising. In establishing a direct (although farfetched) threat to the organization's existence, they guaranteed a hearing for their demands.

Conflict effects and is affected by four variables. They are: relative power, interaction, sentiment, and attrition. [7] Let's take a look at what happened in the United People campaigns in terms of these variables. Interaction between the two groups had occurred continuously, behind the scenes, moving straight toward

---

104

The United Fund, in attempting to utilize the presence of opposition to stimulate greater dedication on the part of campaign volunteers in 1970, had encouraged, within its own ranks, hostile sentiments toward United People. The United People organization, on the other hand, had attempted to keep personalities out of the conflict and had made every effort to praise the good intentions and dedication of the leaders and volunteer workers of United Fund and United Appeal. In so doing they may have neutralized, to some extent, the bitterness which could have prolonged the conflict and hindered the eventual settlement of differences.

Attrition in the conflict was calculable and highly symbolic. Because funding campaigns must set goals, United People could conceivably score successive victories. Because the dollar figure was so visible, the victory appeared as "all or nothing," although the differential was less than 6 percent both in 1970 and 1971. The success of United Appeal in reaching its campaign goal in 1972, in the absence of a boycott, actually served to reinforce the salience of the earlier United People victories. The United People had a strategic advantage with regard to attrition because its only goal was the prevention of its opponent's goal. Had the United Appeal swung the mallet and rung the bell each year, the attrition of the United People would have been visible, but far less so.

The United People may have made some strategic errors in initial calculations of the power of their opponent. This, perhaps, prolonged the conflict. They seem to have underestimated the reservoir of goodwill the United Fund had nurtured and compounded over the years. United People had chosen a formidable opponent. The lifeblood of fund raising is public relations, and in a fight for credibility the United People were dealing with seasoned thespians of the public theater.

Another significant underestimation was the extent of public resistance to the boycott strategy. The city has long seen itself as a quiet place, benevolently overseen by the corporate elite. Some describe the historic role of National Cash Register as not unlike

---

105

In the eyes of the public, the United People, Righter, and the Congregation for Reconciliation were closely aligned. This created two crosscurrents. On the one hand, it provided an air of legitimacy otherwise absent from the United People. As the 1971 campaign chairman for United Appeal said in a news interview, "You know, it's not becoming to a man who's a member of the clergy to go around using those sorts of tactics. I've always felt the United Appeal had a very strong religious flavor, and should have, because it's a humanitarian effort and service. I wish he'd help us." Obviously, the religious symbols embodied in United People created a degree of cognitive dissonance in the United Appeal, since this openly challenged their implicit claim to have God on their side.

On the other hand, the involvement of the Congregation for Reconciliation in a venture potentially undermining of a good liberal cause stirred dissonance among church people. As a result, local clergy, especially Presbyterians, experienced a great deal of pressure from their laity. This was particularly so in the larger and wealthier congregations where corporation support for United Appeal was reflected among active lay leaders. The largest Presbyterian church in the city, in its newsletter circulated to a membership of over three thousand, warned:

---

106

While many clergy recalled threats of withdrawal of money and/or membership from their congregations in protest of the activities of the Congregation for Reconciliation, only a few reported directly traceable loss of members or withholding of benevolence to Righter and his congregation. This should not, however, negate or underplay the sense of pressure felt by many clergy during the United People campaigns.

We should note here the discrepancy between the stress felt by Presbyterian and United Church of Christ clergy. The early publicity about the Congregation had indicated its affiliation with the Presbyterians. Several UCC pastors have stated they did not believe their laity were generally aware the Congregation for Reconciliation was also affiliated with the United Church of Christ.

Typically, community leaders and clergy believed it appropriate and important to call attention to the need for reform in the United Fund. But only three or four people we talked with endorsed a boycott initiated by a church group as an appropriate strategy to accomplish this. Several additional clergy indicated that their immediate personal reaction to the boycott was favorable but that their views changed as they began to feel the repercussions from laity. In 1971 a group of seventeen clergy released a statement calling for reform in the United Fund but explicitly rejecting Righter's methods. They expressed confidence in the possibility of achieving reform from within the organization. Certainly, as strategy, this move was welcomed by the United Fund to restore balance to the "God is on our side" dimension of the symbolic battle for credibility.